| We introduce a "high-probability" framework for repeated games with incomplete information. In our nonequilibrium setting, players aim to guarantee a certain payoff with high probability, rather than in expected value. We provide a high-probability counterpart of the classical result of Mertens and Zamir for the zero-sum repeated games. Any payoff that can be guaranteed with high probability can be guaranteed in expectation, but the reverse is not true. Hence, unlike the average payoff case where the payoff guaranteed by each player is the negative of the payoff by the other player, the two guaranteed payoffs would differ in the highprobability framework. One motivation for this framework comes from information transmission systems, where it is customary to formulate problems in terms of asymptotically vanishing probability of error. Finally, we introduce compound arbitrarily varying channels, and use the high-probability framework to study this problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
The standard game theory framework considers players who are von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility maximizers; that is, they maximize the expected value of some "utility function" defined over potential outcomes. A necessary condition of finding equilibria in such framework, of course, is to know the exact functional form of the utility function in order to translate payoffs and probabilities to utilities. The complexity of the analysis under nonstandard functional forms, on the one hand, and the complications of identifying the functional forms of the utilities of the real-world players, on the other hand, are two of the challenges of the standard framework.
In this paper, we undertake the above issues by introducing a nonequilibrium solution concept. We develop an analytical framework for (zero-sum) repeated games to study the following question: What is the highest payoff that players can "guarantee with high probability?" More precisely, we are concerned with payoffs that can be guaranteed (with some strategy) with probability 1 À , where goes to 0 as the games get played more and more. This "high-probability game theory" framework is particularly valuable when agents, rather than being expected utility maximizers, are concerned with achieving some threshold utility. The framework that we introduce helps us to derive results analogous to the existing ones on repeated games with incomplete information by Mertens and Zamir [1] .
Let us motivate our solution concept by a simple, concrete example. Consider the zero-sum repeated game depicted in Fig. 1 between Alice and Bob. There is a state variable S with uniform distribution over {0, 1}.
Alice's payoff tables for s ¼ 0 and s ¼ 1 are given (Bob's payoff is negative of Alice's payoff). We assume that Alice and Bob have no knowledge of the value of S. The game is played n times between Alice and Bob, with the state variable being drawn at the beginning and kept fixed throughout the n games. Alice and Bob only get to see their payoff values after playing all the n games; hence they cannot gain any information about S throughout the game. We make the assumption that if the total sum of the n payoffs of the n games of a player is positive, that player wins the entire game. There is a draw if the total sum of each player is zero.
Let us first assume that Alice aims to maximize the expected value of her average payoffs in the n games. Since Alice and Bob do not know S, we can compute the average table with weights p S ð0Þ ¼ p S ð1Þ ¼ 1=2 as given in the bottom of Fig. 1 . The average table is symmetric and a Nash equilibrium strategy is for players to choose their actions uniformly at random. This gives Alice an expected average payoff of 1.5. Thus, Alice can guarantee a positive total expected payoff in the Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. However, with this strategy, Alice's average payoff is negative with probability 1/2; it is À7=4 when s ¼ 0. Therefore, with probability 1/2 when s ¼ 0, she will lose the entire n game as her total sum payoff becomes negative with high probability (w.h.p.) by the law of large numbers. On the other hand, assume that Alice plays a different strategy of choosing action R all the time (which is not part of a Nash equilibrium). Then, Bob will play U and this leads to a payoff of 1 for Alice regardless of whether s ¼ 0 or s ¼ 1. The payoff of 1 is smaller than the average payoff of 1.5 that an equilibrium strategy will give her, but is guaranteed with probability one, thus ensuring that Alice will win the entire game.
More generally, given an arbitrary repeated game (with complete or incomplete information), we ask that given an 9 0, whether Alice has a strategy, for a sufficiently large enough n, that guarantees her total sum payoff to be greater than a number v with probability 1 À . In studying this natural problem, one may consider the whole n games as a one stage strategic form game, and then consider the sequence of these games for different values of n, as n becomes larger and larger. However, we find it easier to analyze this game as an extensive form repeated game in a high-probability framework.
Motivation From Information Theory: One motivation for a high-probability framework comes from information theory, where repeated use of a channel and a vanishing probability of error as the number of channel uses n tends to infinity is common. In the following, we explain this via a simple example that requires little background in information theory.
We need some definitions: a binary erasure channel (BEC) is a communication medium with a binary input X 2 f0; 1g. The output of this channel, denoted by random variable Y, is a symbol from f0; 1; eg where e indicates that the input symbol is erased. When the input symbol is not erased ðY 6 ¼ eÞ, we have Y ¼ X. The transmitter will not know whether a transmission has been erased at the receiver.
Let us denote the erasure event by random variable E, i.e., E ¼ 1 indicates that the input bit is not erased. When we use the channel n times, we will have erasure random variables E 1 ; E 2 ; . . . ; E n for each transmission. We assume that each E i 2 f0; 1g is a function of three variables: an internal channel state variable S, an input A i by Alice, and an input B i by Bob, according to E i ¼ g S ðA i ; B i Þ, where g s ða; bÞ is a given function for any s 2 S. Random variable S is randomly chosen at the beginning and is fixed through the n channel uses (slow fading). Alice and Bob have initial partial knowledge about S by having access to S A and S B that are correlated with S. Fig. 2 illustrates this configuration. Alice aims to help the transmission (trying to make E i variables one, as much as possible) and Bob aims to disrupt it. Neither Alice nor Bob observes the variables E i . But we assume that both Alice and Bob observe each other actions (inputs to the channel) causally; therefore, if they know each other's strategies, each party can infer some information about the other party's side information by observing their actions. Hence, there is a tradeoff for both parties between using and hiding their side information: using it can be advantageous for the current transmission while actions can reveal information to the other party which could be turned against them in subsequent transmissions. We can view the above as a game with incomplete information if we consider E i to be the payoff of the game for Alice (the payoff of Bob will be the negative of the payoff of Alice). Now, suppose that Alice can guarantee the expected total payoff of n=2. It may be the case that with probability 1/2, her total payoff is zero, and with probability 1/2 her total payoff is n. Then, with probability 1/2 all the transmitted bits will be erased and no communication will be possible. Therefore, having a bound on the expected value of total payoff is not useful. On the other hand, given some small 9 0, assume that Alice can guarantee her total payoff to be at least n=3 with probability 1 À , regardless of how Bob plays. In other words, with probability 1 À , at least n=3 bits from the n bits that the transmitter sends will become available at the receiver. Then, with probability 1 À , the transmitter can send about n=3 data bits by employing standard coding techniques such as fountain codes. Therefore, a high-probability framework is of relevance to information transmission problem over this adversarial BEC channel.
It is possible to think of other information theory problems with a threshold phenomenon where the highprobability framework is of relevance. For instance, in coding theory, the minimum distance of a code gives a guarantee that if the number of changes in a code sequence is sufficiently small, decoding will be successful. One can consider a problem where Alice and Bob are having actions that (along with a channel state) determines when a transmission will become erroneous. It would be desirable for Alice to make sure that a number of errors are bounded to ensure successful decoding. Or for instance, one can imagine a control system with two players, one who is trying to increase the error and the other who is trying to reduce the error. It may be that a bound on the total error of a system is of importance (and not its expected value).
In Section V, we provide a technical application of the high-probability framework for the problem of communication over a certain compound arbitrarily varying channel. We are not aware of a direct approach that can solve this problem without the high-probability framework.
Our Contribution: In this paper, we focus on repeated games with incomplete information. Incomplete information refers to the fact that there are some unknown parameters that affect the payoff of the players. Each player has its own partial knowledge of the parameters, which may leak to the other player through actions during the repeated game. There is a tradeoff between hiding and using the information to each party. We refer the reader to [3] for a comprehensive treatment. Our main contribution in this paper is to find payoffs that can be guaranteed with high probability. We introduce a nonequilibrium approach-the high-probability condition-and characterize payoffs that can satisfy that condition. A nontrivial application of this framework to compound arbitrarily varying channel is also given. High-probability guarantees may also find applications in security games [14] .
Related Work: The literature of repeated game theory contains several ideas that are related to our paper. The standard approach to infinitely repeated games with no discount rate is the closest to ours, but it is concerned with the average payoff as a criterion of equilibrium [7] . As we discussed before, our paper in some sense provides a high probability analogous of [1] . Fudenberg and Levine [8] study a repeated game of imperfect monitoring where they provide asymptotic bounds for the payoff of the player whose reputation (against his opponent) is crucial in identifying the equilibrium. The robust mechanism design literature is also related to ours, in that the goal is to "guarantee" a payoff (in a maxmin sense), but with a focus on single period games; see, for instance, [9] and [10] . One approach toward capturing the risk of players is to define "risk-sensitive" payoffs, e.g., by evaluating the moment generating function of the payoff at some 9 0 [13] . The larger the , the more the payoff is sensitive to higher order statistics and risk. Furthermore, a refinement of Nash equilibrium called risk dominance was introduced by Harsanyi and Selten to capture the existence of uncertainty in the action of the other player [15] .
There have been few previous works on implicit flow of information through actions in information theory [12] , [16] . Also, some recent work addresses implicit communication from the perspective of game theory to characterize the tradeoff between hiding and using the information [6] , [11] . However, there are new conceptual features in our treatment. It should be pointed out, however, that classical game theory has already found many applications in information theory in scenarios where we have channels with unknown parameters, or channels that can vary arbitrarily (adversarial channels). The payoff function is generally either a mutual information (e.g., [17] - [21] ) or a coding error probability (e.g., [22] and [23] ). Other than the problem of channels with uncertainty, game theory is vastly being used in other problems of information theory such as adversarial sources, power allocation, and spectrum sharing.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section I-A, we define our notation. In Section II, we formally define the problem. In Section III, we review a result in repeated games with incomplete information in the expected value regime, and finally, in Section IV, we prove our main result which is finding the highest value a party can guarantee with high probability in repeated games with incomplete information. Section V includes an application of the framework.
A. Notation
We use capital letters for random variables and small letters for their realizations. We use ½i to denote the set f1; 2; . . . ; ig. Then X ½i denotes X 1 ; X 2 ; . . . ; X i . We use both subscripts and superscripts to denote indices; e.g., X j is the random variable (rv) X indexed by j, and X j i is rv X indexed by i and j. Thus, X ½k ½n ¼ fðX j i : i 2 ½n; j 2 ½kg. For a function f , Cav f and Vex f denote its lower concave envelope and upper convex envelope, respectively; e.g., Cav f is the smallest concave function that lies above f , and Vex f is the largest convex function that lies below the function. The support of a probability distribution p over a finite set A is defined as SuppðpÞ ¼ fa 2 A : pðaÞ 9 0g.
For a sequence of size n, say x ½n from a finite alphabet X , let n x ðx ½n Þ be the number of appearances of symbol x in x ½n . For a random variable X with distribution p X ðxÞ on a finite alphabet X , the set of -typical n-sequences is defined as the set of all x ½n 2 X n such that [25] n x ðx ½n Þ n À p X ðxÞ p X ðxÞ 8x 2 X and is denoted by T n ðXÞ. This is sometimes referred to as "robust typicality." This definition naturally extends to more than one random variable, i.e., for a pair of random variables X; Y, the set of jointly typical sequences T n ðX; YÞ is defined as the set of sequences x ½n ; y ½n such that for all x 2 X; y 2 Y n x;y x ½n ; y ½n n À p X;Y ðx; yÞ p X;Y ðx; yÞ where n x;y x ½n ; y ½n :¼ f1 i n : x i ¼ x; y i ¼ yg :
II. DEFINITION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a two player zero-sum game with Alice and Bob as players. We are interested in Alice's payoffs; hence Alice is the maximizer and Bob is the minimizer.
Definition 1:
We define the value of a strategic game Ç, VðÇÞ, as Alice's payoff in a Nash equilibrium; this value is the same for all Nash equilibriums since the game is zero-sum. We use V A ðÇÞ and V B ðÇÞ to denote Alice's and Bob's payoffs in any Nash equilibrium, respectively. Hence, VðÇÞ ¼ V A ðÇÞ ¼ ÀV B ðÇÞ.
A standard zero-sum repeated game of incomplete information consists of the following components [1] .
• A zero-sum two-player game À called the stage game which is repeated n times. This game is between two players, say Alice and Bob, with finite sets of permissible actions A and B, respectively. For each state s 2 S, we have a payoff table g s where g s ða; bÞ denotes Alice's payoff when Alice plays action a 2 A and Bob plays action b 2 B in À. • A probability distribution p S ðsÞ on a finite set of states, S, from which the state of the game is chosen by nature at random at the beginning of the game. Without loss of generality, we may assume that p S ðsÞ 9 0 for all s, i.e., S ¼ Suppðp S Þ. • This state is fixed throughout the n repetitions of À, but neither Alice nor Bob knows the exact value of the state. Instead, Alice and Bob receive S A and S B as the side information about S, respectively. We assume that S A and S B are functions of S, i.e., S A ¼ T A ðSÞ and S B ¼ T B ðSÞ. This assumption is made without loss of generality, as argued later. The alphabets of random variables S A and S B are denoted by S A and S B , respectively. • Each party plays actions in the repeated game based on the information they have since the beginning of the game, i.e., their side informations S A and S B and the history of the game A ½iÀ1 and B ½iÀ1 which are Alice's and Bob's actions up to stage i, respectively. Note that in stage k, Alice and Bob play A k and B k simultaneously; here we have shown actions with capital letters to emphasize that they are random variables since the two parties are allowed to employ random strategies, and the initial state S is random. • We assume that Alice and Bob just observe their actions, not the payoffs they have received. When all n stages are finished, Alice receives the time average of the payoffs of stage games, i.e.,
Note that n is a random variable. The repeated game with above components is denoted by À T A ;T B n ðpÞ, where p is the prior distribution on state space S. With an abuse of notation, we alternatively write À T A ;T B n ðSÞ where S is the random variable with distribution p S .
A few points should be made about the above definition. First, note that the assumption that S A and S B are deterministic functions of S is not restrictive. In fact, in the general case where S A and S B are allowed to be random functions of S, we can define a random variable N where S A and S B are deterministic functions of S and N. Therefore, for the new repeated game with stateŜ ¼ ðS; NÞ and payoff tablesĝ ðs;nÞ ¼ g s side informations are of our desired form and also the resulting payoffs do not change.
We can consider the strategic form for the above extensive form game and call itÀ T A ;T B n ðSÞ. In this strategic form game, each action of a player is a pure strategy for him in the repeated game, i.e., a collection of deterministic functions determining what action should be played at each stage given the observations up to that time. The payoff of this game is the expected outcome of the repeated game defined as in (1) when S is generated from distribution p S ðsÞ. This strategic form game is indeed zero-sum, hence has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium with value VðÀ T A ;T B n ðSÞÞ. This could be defined rigorously as follows.
Definition 2:
The strategic form gameÀ T A ;T B n ðSÞ is defined as a one stage zero-sum game with action setsÂ for Alice andB for Bob wherê
where f i ða ½iÀ1 ; b ½iÀ1 ; s A Þ determines which action Alice will play if the history of the game is a ½iÀ1 ; b ½iÀ1 and she has the side information S A , and Bob's strategies are similar. Given a realization S ¼ s, a unique deterministic sequence of actions is played by Alice and Bob, denoted by a ½n ðsÞ; b ½n ðsÞ where a i ðsÞ ¼f i a ½iÀ1 ðsÞ; b ½iÀ1 ðsÞ; T A ðsÞ b i ðsÞ ¼g i a ½iÀ1 ðsÞ; b ½iÀ1 ðsÞ; T B ðsÞ :
The payoff function of this game is defined as follows:
As mentioned above, this is a finite zero-sum game, hence has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Any strategy of this form is a mixture of pure strategies defined above, called a mixed strategy in the repeated game. However, since the repeated game À n is with perfect recall, i.e., each player remembers his own past actions, Kuhn's theorem implies that without loss of generality we may only consider behavioral strategies (see [24] , for instance). A behavioral strategy is a collection of random functions assigning probabilities to each action given the history of the game at each stage.
Definition 3:
A behavioral strategy of Alice in the game À n is a collection of random functions where
is the probability that Alice chooses action a i when the history of the game is a ½iÀ1 ; b ½iÀ1 and Alice's side information is s A . Bob's behavioral strategies are defined similarly via ðb i ja ½iÀ1 ; b ½iÀ1 ; s B Þ. The choices of Alice and Bob in different stages are assumed to be conditionally independent given the past action history, 1 i.e., the probability distribution on the outcome of the game is
The set of Alice's behavioral strategies in À n is denoted byÃ n and Bob's behavioral strategies is denoted byB n . Note that when players employ pure strategies, actions are deterministic functions of the history and the side information. The value of À n is defined as the value of its strategic form. As a result of Kuhn's theorem, we have
where A i and B i are random variables denoting the actions of Alice and Bob. Let n ¼ ð1=nÞ P n i¼1 g S ðA i ; B i Þ be the time average payoff of Alice. Then, (7) implies that if Alice plays her equilibrium strategy, independent of Bob's strategy, we have
which shows that Alice can guarantee VðÀ T A ;T B n ðSÞÞ in the average sense by playing an equilibrium (behavioral) strategy. Conversely, from (7), if Bob plays his equilibrium strategy, Alice cannot guarantee more than the value of the game, i.e., E½ n VðÀ T A ;T B n ðSÞÞ. Hence VðÀ T A ;T B n ðSÞÞ is the maximum value Alice can guarantee in the expected value sense. The asymptotic behavior of this value, i.e., lim n!1 VðÀ T A ;T B n ðSÞÞ is analyzed by Mertens and Zamir [1] . We will review a special case of this result in Section III.
On the other hand, one might be interested in finding the value Alice can guarantee w.h.p. instead of in average. There are two ways of defining this concept.
Definition 4:
We say that Alice can strongly guarantee a value v if for all 9 0, there exists a natural number N such that for all n 9 N, Alice has a strategy in À T A ;T B n ðp S Þ so that for all strategies of Bob in this game we have Pð n G vÞ G :
Definition 5: We say that Alice can weakly guarantee a value v if for all 9 0, there exists N such that for all n9N and for all strategy for Bob in À T A ;T B n ðp S Þ, there exists a strategy for Alice in this game such that Pð n G vÞ G :
Note that the difference between the above two definitions is that if Alice wants to guarantee a payoff strongly, then she needs to have a universal strategy independent of Bob's strategy. A universal strategy of Alice should work for all possible strategies of Bob. On the other hand, when Alice wants to guarantee a value weakly, she can adapt her strategy based on Bob's strategy. Therefore, it is evident that if Alice can guarantee a value in the strong sense, she can guarantee it in the weak sense as well. 
III. REVIEW OF RESULTS FOR THE EXPECTED VALUE PAYOFF REGIME
In this section, we review an existing result for guaranteeing payoffs in the expected value. In this approach, the Nash equilibrium of the n stage game, VðÀ n Þ is asymptotically analyzed and its limit value as well as its convergence rate is obtained. We first need a definition.
Definition 7: Given a distribution p S on set S and payoff tables g s ða; bÞ for s 2 S, define uðp S Þ as the value of the one-stage zero-sum game with the average payoff table P s p S ðsÞg s . We may also denote it by uðSÞ where S is the random variable with distribution p S .
Consider the special case where one player is fully aware of the game state and the other has no side information. In order to do so we employ the notation ; as the function which gives no side information, i.e., it has a constant output ;ðsÞ ¼ 0 for all s 2 S. On the other hand, let 1 be the side information function which gives full information, i.e., 1ðsÞ ¼ s for all s 2 S. We consider the case where T A ¼ ;, T B ¼ 1. Then, we have the following.
Theorem 1 [2, Th. 3.16]: lim n!1 VðÀ ;;1 n ðp S ÞÞ exists and is equal to Vex uðp S Þ where Vex u is the upper convex envelope of u as a function on the probability simplex. Furthermore, there exists a constant C such that for all p S we have
Remark 1: In [2] , Alice is assumed to have full information and Bob knows nothing; in fact, their place is reversed. In order to change their place, we can negate the payoff table. That is why we have Vex instead of Cav here and also the inequality direction in (11) is reversed.
To be more precise, statement of Theorem 3.16 of [2] in our notation translates to
Noting V A ðÇÞ ¼ ÀV B ðÇÞ for any zero-sum game Ç and CavðÀf Þ ¼ ÀVexðf Þ for any function f transforms the above equation into (11) . Also note that on the righthand side of the analog of [2, eq. (11)] we have the term P s2S ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi p S ðsÞð1 À p S ðsÞÞ p which is upper bounded by jSj and is absorbed into the constant C here.
Observe that the constant C in (11) is independent of p S , implying uniform convergence of the sequence VðÀ ;;1 n ðp S ÞÞ.
In the following, we provide an intuitive sketch of the key ideas used to prove Theorem 1; see [2] for a rigorous proof. Alice initially does not know anything about S. Bob knows S and his actions may increase Alice's information about S. Let us denote Alice's information about S at time stage i by the mutual information J i ¼ IðS; A ½iÀ1 B ½iÀ1 Þ for i 2 ½n. The sequence fJ i g satisfies the following properties: J 1 ¼ 0, J i J iþ1 , and J i 2 ½0; HðSÞ. Take some 9 0. We say that an information jump occurs at stage i if J i À J iÀ1 ! . Since J i 2 ½0; HðSÞ, the number of jumps is at most the constant k ¼ HðSÞ=. Let I ¼ fi 2 ½n : J i À J iÀ1 g. Since k is a constant, jI j ! n À k. The payoff of Alice is its average over time stages 1 to n and is dominated by the average of stages in I , i.e., 1 n
At time instances in i 2 I, Bob's strategy is essentially nonrevealing in the sense that if from Alice's view, S has conditional pmf q i ðsÞ ¼ pðsja ½iÀ1 b ½iÀ1 Þ at time stage i, we have that q i ðsÞ % q iþ1 ðsÞ. Then, the payoff that Alice can obtain at time stage i is that of a nonrevealing uðq i ðsÞÞ. The average payoff over various realizations of a ½iÀ1 b ½iÀ1 is equal to
This demonstrates that Alice's payoff is greater than or equal to Vex uðpÞ, regardless of how Bob plays.
On the other hand, Bob has a strategy ensuring that Alice's payoff does not exceed Vex uðpÞ. Assume that
for some nonnegative weights i ; i 2 ½k adding up to one, and pmfs p i ðsÞ satisfying P i i p i ðsÞ ¼ pðsÞ. Let V be a random variable on alphabet set f1; 2; . . . ; kg satisfying pðV ¼ iÞ ¼ i . Rv V is jointly distributed with S as follows: pðV ¼ i; S ¼ sÞ ¼ i p i ðsÞ. Bob can locally create V by passing S through a channel pðvjsÞ. Bob's strategy is then as follows: he uses his actions in the first few instances of the game to communicate V to Alice. The payoff in these first few instances of the game do not affect the overall payoff over the n games. By doing this, Bob is effectively announcing V to Alice, at no effective cost. Bob then proceeds as follows: he completely forgets the exact state S and only given the variable V, he plays the optimal strategy of uðp i Þ when V ¼ i. In this case, since the marginal distribution of S is p i and Alice knows whatever Bob knows about the state, the posterior of the state does not change from stage to stage from Alice's point of view, i.e., she does not learn further about the state from Bob's actions than the initial announcement V. Hence
Roughly speaking, this argument shows that the optimal strategy for the informed player is to announce whatever the uninformed player is eventually going to learn about the state at the beginning of the game and forget the extra information, so that both players end up having a balanced information about the state. This completes the sketch of the proof of [2] . An interesting implication of Theorem 1 is as follows: considering the mixed Nash strategies, Alice's mixed strategy ensures learning and exploiting from Bo's actions about state S in an optimal way, for all possible strategies of Bob. In other words, it implies existence of a "universal" algorithm for Alice that performs as if Alice knew Bob's strategy.
IV. GUARANTEEING WITH HIGH PROBABILITY
In this section, we find the values of v s sup and v w sup . Without loss of generality, we assume that p S ðsÞ; p S A ðs A Þ 9 0 for all s 2 S; s A 2 S A , where S A ¼ T A ðSÞ, otherwise we can remove the symbols with probability zero. Therefore T À1 A ðs A Þ :¼ fs 2 S : T A ðsÞ ¼ s A g is nonempty for all s A . Our main result is the following.
and they are both equal to
where S in the above expression has lawp S .
Remark 2: Note that the distributionp S which appears in the minimization of the above problem should not be confused with the original distribution p S ðSÞ (which was assumed to have a support equal to S). Remark 3: To show that Alice can strongly guarantee the given payoff, one needs to show existence of a universal strategy for Alice that can be used against all possible strategies of Bob. Unfortunately, our proof only shows existence of such a strategy. Finding an explicit strategy for Bob is an interesting open problem.
Before getting into the proof of this theorem in Section IV-A, we prove a few lemmas. Our first observation is that the values of v w sup and v s sup depend only on the support of pðsÞ. 
where p min 6 ¼ 0 is the minimum value of p S ðsÞ on its support. Now, if the state is generated under distributionp S and Alice employs the same strategy , since the supports of the two distributions are the same, we have
since was arbitrary, this means that value v could be guaranteed under distributionp S . This means that In the following lemma, we reduce the problem of finding v w sup and v s sup to the case where Alice has zero side information about the game state and Bob exactly knows its value. We use the notations ; and 1 from the previous section.
and similarly for v s sup . In other words, v w sup does not depend on T B and from Alice's perspective, it is always as if Bob knows the state perfectly. To show this, consider the following strategy for Bob: he guesses the state S randomly and proceeds assuming that his guess is the correct value for S. Since the state space is finite, with a nonzero and constant probability his guess becomes true. But since Alice should guarantee with high probability, she cannot neglect the constant probability of Bob's guess becoming true. Therefore, her strategy should be for the worst case, guaranteeing her payoff conditioned on the event that Bob's guess about the state is correct. This completes the proof for v w sup ðS; 
The main challenge to prove the above statement is to handle the tradeoff between hiding and using information.
Since v s sup v w sup , it suffices to show the following two propositions. 
To prove the above propositions, we first show a lemma. 
Note that in the game n , we give Bob the freedom to choose the payoff table which makes him stronger, hence yielding a lower bound for the value Alice can guarantee. However, the game is repeated n times in n while in the original problem Alice should guarantee a payoff as the number of repetitions of the game goes to infinity. In order to address this, Alice considers an optimal strategy for herself in n and repeats it in blocks of size n. However, since Bob can impose correlation among these blocks, in order to show that this can guarantee her the same value as in n , we use a martingale convergence argument in the following.
Proof of Lemma 3: Note that n ðSÞ is a repeated zerosum game with perfect recall, so using Kuhn's theorem, we may consider behavioral strategies in a Nash equilibrium of this game.
Assume v ¼ Vð n ðSÞÞ is the value of n ðSÞ and is an equilibrium strategy for Alice. This means that for all strategy for Bob, the expected value of Alice by playing is at least v. Now, we repeat game n ðSÞ, m times. Hence, we have a game of size mn with m blocks of length n. At the beginning of each block, a new value for s (a new payoff table) is chosen by Bob and the game of length n is played. We call the state of block i as S i and actions of this block by a i ½n and b i ½n for Alice and Bob, respectively. Here a i j for i 2 ½m; j 2 ½n is the jth action of Alice in the block i.
Assume Alice plays strategy in an i.i.d. fashion in each block, which means that she plays action a i j at block i with probability
Now we claim that playing this strategy by Alice results in guaranteeing v À w.h.p. for her when m is large enough. For doing so, assume that Bob plays an arbitrary strategy in the game with length mn. More precisely, he chooses state s i for block i with probability s i js ½iÀ1 a 
Now define the random variable W k to be It suffices to show that for any realization of the history, s ½k ; a ½k ½n b ½k ½n , the expected value is at least nv. To show this, note that for this specific realization of the history, the term inside the expectation is the sum of Alice's payoff in a game n where Alice uses equilibrium strategy and Bob uses strategỹ
Since is an equilibrium strategy, for all strategy of Bob including the above in block k þ 1 the expected value of Alice's payoff is at least the value of the game. Hence, for all a 
Substituting this into (26) shows that W k is a submartingale. Note that
where M is an upper bound on payoffs. Now using Azuma's inequality (see [26] and [27] 
where the last inequality holds w.h.p. for m large enough. Therefore, Alice can guarantee payoff v w.h.p. for the game with the game n repeated m times by playing i.i.d. Next, observe that playing the same strategy by Alice can guarantee her payoff v À for game nm for large enough m. The reason is that Bob's strategies in nm are a subset of Bob's strategies in the m repetition of n , as in the former Bob chooses s once at the beginning, while in the latter, he is allowed to choose it at the beginning of each of the m blocks. Finally, observe that Alice can guarantee payoffs arbitrarily close to v for game k , as long as k is large enough, even when k is not of the product form nm for some m. Let k ¼ mn þ r for some 0 r G n. Alice can play the above good strategy in stages 1 through mn and plays arbitrarily in stage mn þ 1 through nm þ r. Then, the effect of stages nm þ 1 through nm þ r is small arbitrarily since payoffs are bounded and m is large.
To sum this up, we have shown that there is a strategy for Alice (namely, i.i.d.) that guarantees payoff v for Alice, regardless of Bob's strategy. This implies that v s
which is the first part of our claim in (21) . Now using minimax expression for the Nash equilibrium, we have
where in the second equality we have split Bob's (behavioral) strategy into two parts: first choosing the state, then playing actions based on the chosen state and history of the game. h where ðaÞ uses Lemma 3 (which holds for all values of n), ðbÞ uses Theorem 1, ðcÞ uses the fact that the constant C is independent of p, and ðdÞ uses the fact that the minimum of the upper convex envelope of a function is the same as the minimum of the function itself.
Since this holds for all values of n, the result is proved simply by sending n to infinity.
h Proof of Proposition 2: From equation (17), we have that v w sup ðS; ;; 1Þ ¼ v w sup ðS; ;; ;Þ:
For any distribution pðsÞ, using Lemma 1 and Remark 4, we have v w sup ðS; ;; ;Þ v w sup ðpðsÞ; ;; ;Þ, since Supp p & S. Now we claim that v w sup ðp; ;; ;Þ uðpÞ. In order to do so, assume v is a value that Alice can weakly guarantee when the state is generated from distribution p, T A ¼ ; and T B ¼ ;. Therefore, due to the definition, for any 9 0, with n large enough, for any strategy n for Bob in À ;;; n ðpÞ, there exists a strategy n for Alice such that Pð n G vÞ G . Assume Bob plays the equilibrium strategy of uðpÞ, i.i.d. in n games. Then, since initially neither Alice nor Bob has any side information about the state, they do not gain any extra information by observing each other's strategies. Now, looking at the game at stage k, since Bob is playing his equilibrium strategy, E½g S ðA k ; B k Þ uðpÞ. Hence
uðpÞ:
On the other hand, Pð n G vÞ G implies E½ n ! vð1 À Þ. This together with the above inequality gives vð1 À Þ uðpÞ. Since was arbitrary, v uðpÞ and thus v w sup ðS; ;; ;Þ uðpÞ. Since p was arbitrary, by taking minimum over p we get v w sup ðS; ;; ;Þ min pðsÞ uðpÞ:
Substituting this into (38) finishes the proof.
V. APPLICATION
In this section, we provide an application of the highprobability framework. This section assumes a background in information theory. Consider an AVC channel with a legitimate sender/receiver and also an adversary. Assume that the channel has a state S which is partially known to the encoder/decoder and the adversary (imperfect CSI). Communication channel is a conditional probability distribution pðyjx; a; sÞ where x is the encoder's input on the channel, a is adversary's input on the channel, s is the channel state, and y is the output at the decoder. X; Y; A, and S take values in finite sets X , Y, A, and S, respectively. The state S is chosen from a distribution p S . The encoder and the decoder both have the same side information S X about S, while the adversary has a side information S A about it. The channel state is chosen once and for all and remains unchanged during the consecutive uses of the channel (slow fading). However, the channel noise in pðyjx; a; sÞ is independent in different channel uses, i.e., pðy ½n jx ½n ; a ½n ; sÞ ¼ Q n i¼1 pðy i jx i ; a i ; sÞ. Furthermore, as before without loss of generality, we assume that S X and S A are functions of S, i.e., S X ¼ T X ðSÞ and S A ¼ T A ðSÞ and pðs X Þ 9 0 for all s X .
The adversary observes the history of the game at any stage i, i.e., inputs on the channel by the encoder X ½iÀ1 . Likewise, we assume that both the encoder and the decoder observe adversary's input on the channel A ½iÀ1 . Therefore, this is a communication problem with feedback.
We assume that the encoder and the decoder have access to unlimited private shared randomness, unknown to the adversary, allowing them to use randomized algorithms. A ðn; 2 nR Þ code consists of strategies for encoding as well as strategies for decoding. The encoder wants to reliably send a message M in f1; . . . ; 2 nR g via n uses of the channel, while the adversary wants to prevent this from happening. More specifically, at stage i, the encoder creates input X i using the message M, its side information S X , its shared randomness K, as well as X ½iÀ1 ; A ½iÀ1 previous transmissions by himself and the adversary. Therefore, the encoder's strategy is to assign a probability to each symbol in X given the history of the game. Hence, ðx i jx ½iÀ1 ; a ½iÀ1 ; s X ; m; kÞ which is the encoding strategy, determines the probability of the encoder generating symbol x i at time i.
The adversary has also a strategy, which we denote by the conditional pmf ða i jx ½iÀ1 ; a ½iÀ1 ; s A ; k A Þ where k A denotes private randomness of adversary; it determines the probability of choosing a i as the input of the adversary, the history of the game, and adversary's side information.
At the decoder side, we find anM given S X ; Y ½n ; A ½n ; K; thus, we are assuming that receiver observes Y ½n as well as adversary's inputs to the channel. The side information at the decoder is assumed to be S X which is the same as the one at the encoder. A rate R is called achievable if for 9 0, there is some N 0 such that for any n 9 N 0 , we can design encoding/decoding strategies such that independent of adversary's strategy and the channel state, the probability of error, i.e., PðM 6 1 MÞ is smaller than . The supremum over all the achievable rates is called the capacity of the channel and is denoted by C. Our goal is to find C. Fig. 3 depicts our channel model. Following the common assumption in the game theory literature, we assume that both the encoder/decoder and the adversary know each other's strategies. As in a repeated game with incomplete information, there is a tradeoff for both the encoder and the adversary to use or hide their side information about the channel state.
Theorem 3: For the compound-AVC problem described above, the capacity is 
Note that, in general, we cannot change the order of min and max in (39) since the space of product distributions pðaÞp S ðsÞ is not convex. Thus, C 0 G C in general. In fact, the tool introduced in this paper allows for proving achievability of C by reducing the space to product distributions. From a game-theoretic point of view it is not optimal for the adversary to correlate his input with the channel state, since then the encoder will be able to gain information about the channel state by observing adversary's inputs and design a better codebook accordingly.
The lower bound C 0 can be simplified as follows: due to the independence assumption, IðX; YAjSÞ ¼ IðX; YjASÞ. Furthermore, due to the linearity of this expression in A and S, the minimum is achieved for constant A and S, hence (40) reduces to
Note that in finding C 0 , deterministic A ¼ a and S ¼ s are optimal, and the arbitrary varying sequence plays a similar role as the state sequence.
A. Converse
For proving the converse, assume that the adversary puts its inputs i.i.d., from an input distribution pðaÞ independent of all its observations and its side information about the state. Then, for a fixed value of state s, we have a point-to-point channel with input X and output YA. The encoder receives the side information S X ¼ s X ; no further information about S is revealed to him during the transmission, since adversary's input is independent of the state. Therefore, with the observation S X ¼ s X at the encoder and the decoder, we have a classical memoryless compound channel with input X, output YA, and state S with the conditional pmf p SjS X ðsjS X ¼ s X Þ. The capacity of this compound channel is [ where ðaÞ results from the minimax theorem and the fact that IðX; YAjSÞ is concave in pðxÞ and convex in pðsÞ.
Note that the adversary is free to choose any pðaÞ and also any s x can happen with nonzero probability in the main model and the above upper bound holds for any pðaÞ and s X . We can take the minimum to obtain our final upper bound B. Achievability 1) An Auxiliary Game: Before specifying the encoder and the decoder, we define an auxiliary repeated game with incomplete information as follows: take P to be a finite subset of the probability simplex ÁðX Þ over the input alphabet X . The game has two players: the encoder/ decoder (which we call the encoder for the sake of simplicity) and adversary. The action set of the encoder is P and the action set of the adversary is A. The one stage game has jSj tables for each state of the channel. In payoff table corresponding to s 2 S, when the encoder chooses action 2 P and the adversary chooses action a 2 A, payoff IðX; YjS ¼ s; A ¼ aÞ for pðx; yjs; aÞ ¼ ðxÞpðyjx; s; aÞ is assigned to the encoder (and its negative is assigned to the adversary). In the following, instead of writing IðX; Yjs; aÞ, we use Ið; Yjs; aÞ in order to emphasize the dependence on . This game is repeated n times, and the total payoff function of the encoder would be the sum of its individual payoffs from the n games. Further, we assume that the encoder and the adversary receive S X and S A as their side information at the beginning of the game. We call this game À n .
2) From the Auxiliary Game to the Compound-AVC Problem:
Assume that v s sup is the maximum value the encoder can guarantee w.h.p. in the auxiliary game À n . We claim that any rate R G v s sup is achievable for the original compound-AVC problem. Take someR such that R GR G v s sup . Assume the strategy of the encoder for strongly guaranteeing R is p E . Thus, p E ð i js X ; a ½iÀ1 ; ½iÀ1 Þ denotes the probability the encoder chooses distribution i at stage i given his observations up to that time. Adopting p E , the gain of the encoder in À n is at leastR w.h.p. when n is large enough.
Codebook Generation: A codebook of 2 nR codewords of length n can be illustrated by a table of size 2 nR Â n where row index indicates the message and columns indicate time steps. The encoder and the decoder dynamically construct the 2 nR Â n table, column by column, during the transmission process by running the auxiliary game in parallel. In other words, the column i of the codebook (which is needed to make the ith transmission) is created after time step i À 1 as follows: the symbols in the ith column of the codebook table are generated independently from distribution i of the auxiliary game (i.e., 2 nR i.i.d. samples from i are generated and put in the ith column of the table). Note that since the encoder and the decoder have infinite shared randomness, they can use it to simultaneously draw n i.i.d. samples from i . The encoder and the decoder are synchronized as the decoder observes a ½iÀ1 and knows S X .
Encoding: Having message m, the encoder sends the symbols from the mth row of the codebook table that is being dynamically constructed during the transmission process. To write down the joint pmf that this encoding strategy implies, let p A denote adversary's strategy in the compound-AVC problem, i.e., let p A ða i js A ; a ½iÀ1 ; x ½iÀ1 ; k A Þ be the probability that the adversary chooses a i at stage i where x i is the encoder's input on the channel at stage i and k A is adversary's private randomness. The joint distribution of variables in the problem when the state of the channel is s and the message m is Decoding: The decoder has access to a ½n , y ½n . Also note that i is generated from the strategies p E , S X , Vol. 105, No. 2, February 2017 | Proceedings of the IEEE 201 ½iÀ1 , and a ½iÀ1 , which are all known to the decoder. Although we use random strategies in the repeated game and thus i is a random function of the observations, since the encoder and the decoder have access to shared randomness, they can use it to come up with the same i and apply the strategy simultaneously. Also since the encoder and the decoder have shared randomness, the decoder knows the codebook. For and a in finite sets P and A, respectively, define ð; aÞ to be the set of indexes 1 i n where the encoder's distribution is and the adversary's input is a, i.e., ð; aÞ :¼ f1 i n :
Assume the sequence y ½n is received in the decoder. The receiver declares that messagem has been sent if for some s 2Ŝð ½n ; a ½n Þ when for all and a such that n ;a ! n 3=4 , we have and hence PðS 2ŜðÅ ½n ; A ½n ÞÞ ! 1 À . So we can assume that s Ã 2Ŝð ½n ; a ½n Þ. Hence, in order to show that m ¼ 1 satisfies (46), we will show that w.h.p. for all and a such that n ;a ! n 3=4 , we have X ð;aÞ ð1Þ; Y ð;aÞ 2 T n ;a ðX; Yja; s Ã Þ:
In the above expression s Ã is the real state of the channel and s Ã X and s Ã A are the side informations. In the remainder, we condition everything on S ¼ s Ã and, at times, we do not state this explicitly in our expressions for the sake of simplicity. Define W i ¼ N i ða; ; x; yÞ À N i ða; ÞðxÞpðyjx; a; s Ã Þ (50) for 1 i n, where N i ða; ; x; yÞ ¼ fj i :
is the number of times a; ; x; y have happened up to stage i. Note that in the above definition, a; ; x; y are fixed values and not random quantities. Similarly N i ða; Þ ¼ fj i : A j ¼ a; Å j ¼ g :
Also define W 0 ¼ 0. One can easily check that W i is a martingale with respect to H ½i :¼ A ½i Å ½i X ½i Y ½i K A which is the history of the events up to stage i. Also note that jW iþ1 À W i j 1. Therefore, using Azuma's inequality (see [26] and [27] ) for t ¼ n 3=4 , we have P jW n j ! n 3=4 2 exp À n 3=2 2 2n ! (52) which goes to zero as n goes to infinity. Hence, for n large enough with high probability, we have N n ða; ; x; yÞ À N n ða; ÞðxÞpðyjx; a; sÞ n 3=4 : (53)
This statement is true for all a; ; x; y which form a finite set. Therefore, we can take n large enough so that the above expression is true with high probability for all values of a; ; x; y. Now, if N n ð; aÞ ! n 3=4 we have N n ða; ; x; yÞ N n ða; Þ À ðxÞpðyjx; a; sÞ n 3=4 N n ða; Þ
which shows that (49) is satisfied and the first type error vanishes as n goes to infinity. Now we analyze the second type of error. We condition the second error on Å ½n ¼ ½n and A ½n ¼ a ½n ,Y ½n ¼ y ½n . Define E 2 ðmÞ form to be the event wherem satisfies (46). Since the adversary does not observe X ½n ðmÞ form ! 1, unlike the first type of error, it cannot establish a correlation between them. Thus, conditioned on ½n , X ½n ðmÞ is independent and X i ðmÞ is generated from i . Therefore, for s 2Ŝð ½n ; a ½n Þ, we can use packing lemma [25] . Using the independence among blocks ð; aÞ, for some ; a where n ;a ! n 3=4 , if E ;a denotes the event X ð;aÞ ; Y ð;aÞ 2 T n ;a ðX; Yja; sÞ we have PðE ;a Þ 2 Àn ;a Ið;Yja;sÞÀðÞ ð Þ for some ðÞ that converges to zero as converges to zero. Now using the independence of the above events, we have À log P E ;a 8; a : n ;a ! n 3=4 ! X ;a:n ;a !n 3=4 n ;a Ið; Yja; sÞ À ðÞ ð Þ : (55)
Now since the mutual information is bounded and the terms corresponding to those i ; a i that do not appear in the above expression have length less than n 3=4 , and the set of possible ; a is finite, there is a bounded constant " M such that X ;a:n ;a !n 3=4 n ;a Ið; Yja; sÞ À ðÞ ð Þ ! X i Ið i ; Yja i ; sÞ À nðÞ À " Mn 3=4 ! nR À ðÞ À " Mn À1=4
where the last inequality uses the assumption s 2Ŝð ½n ; a ½n Þ. Therefore, using union bound
Mn À1=4 ð Þ the above value goes to zero as n goes to infinity by appropriate choice of sinceR 9 R. Hence, we have proved that any rate below v s sup is achievable.
3) Computing v s sup for the Auxiliary Game: In the rest of the proof, we use Theorem 2 to find the value of v s sup .
We need to first find uðpÞ, which is the game value for the average payoff IðX; YAjSÞ:
In the above argument, the set P is a finite and arbitrary subset of distributions on X . Now the only thing which remains to show is that by appropriate choice of finite set P we can get arbitrarily close to the target value in (39). In order to do so, define function f as f pðxÞ; pðaÞ; pðsÞ ð Þ ¼IðX; YAjSÞ
where the joint distribution is pðsÞpðxÞpðaÞpðyjxasÞ. This function is continuous on the product of compact spaces which is compact itself. Therefore, f is uniformly continuous. Hence, since the set of distributions on X is compact, for every given 9 0, there is a finite covering P of ÁðX Þ where for all pðxÞ 2 ÁðX Þ, there existspðxÞ 2 P such that for all pðsÞ; pðaÞ f pðsÞ; pðxÞ; pðaÞ ð Þ À f pðsÞ;pðxÞ; pðaÞ ð Þ :
Therefore, by appropriate choice of finite set P we can get within any to the target value in (39). h
